The constitutionality of parallel civil forfeiture proceedings and criminal prosecutions under the double jeopardy clause in the United States = La constitucionalidad de procedimientos de comiso civil y procesos penales paralelos bajo la cláusula double jeopardy en los Estados Unidos by Escobar Veas, Javier
701
The Constitutionality of Parallel Civil Forfeiture 
Proceedings and Criminal Prosecutions under the 





Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, Milano, Italia
javier.escobar@mail.udp.cl
 http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9266-0396
abstRact: In the Unites States the existence of statutes that allow to 
declare forfeiture of the property used in certain prohibited ways in 
civil proceedings without the general safeguards of criminal law is an 
extended legal practice. This parallel law enforcement system, however, 
has raised several constitutional discussions. One of these debates 
concerns the compatibility of the parallel system with the double 
jeopardy clause: does the double jeopardy clause bar the government 
from bringing a civil forfeiture proceeding against a defendant that has 
previously been convicted in a criminal court for the same offence? 
The aim of the present article is studying the evolution of the case law 
of the Supreme Court of the United States on the constitutionality of 
parallel civil forfeiture proceedings and criminal prosecutions under the 
double jeopardy clause, analysing the current state of the jurisprudence 
and its possible further developments. 
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intROdUctiOn
Asset forfeiture has emerged in the last decades as a major weapon 
in efforts to combat crime.2 In the United States there are several both 
federal and state statues that allow to declare forfeiture of the property 
used in certain prohibited ways in civil proceedings.3 
2 REINHART, Douglas. Applying the Eighth Amendment to Civil Forfeiture 
After Austin v. United States: Excessiveness and Proportionality. William & 
Mary Law Review, v. 36, n. 1, p. 235-268, 1994, p. 236; JOHNSON, Barry L. 
Purging the Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous Excessive Fines Clause and 
Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on Forfeiture after United States v. Baja-
kajian. University of Illinois Law Review, n. 2, p. 461-516, 2000, p. 462. 
3 KLEIN, Susan R. Civil in Rem Forfeiture and Double Jeopardy. Iowa Law 
Review, v. 82, n. 1, p. 183-274, 1996, p. 195; BATRA, Rishi. Resolving Civil 
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On the one hand, criminal forfeiture statutes are enacted to 
punish criminal defendants following a criminal conviction. Since the 
criminal proceeding is directed to punish the defendant and criminal 
forfeitures are actually imposed as part of the criminal sentence, these 
forfeitures are considered sanctions in personam.4 On the contrary, civil 
forfeiture does not require neither a criminal conviction nor criminal 
charges against the owner of the property.5 Moreover, the jurisdiction 
in a civil forfeiture proceeding is in rem, therefore the guilt of the owner 
of the property is not relevant: the case is brought against the property 
and, in case of conviction, it is the property itself that is deemed guilty. 
As the Supreme Court has affirmed, civil forfeiture is based on the idea 
that “the thing is primarily considered the offender”.6 
Regarding the possibility to bring parallel civil forfeiture actions 
and criminal prosecutions based on the same facts, the Supreme Court 
has noted that Congress has authorised this option since the earliest 
years of the United States.7 Therefore, the government can prosecute a 
defendant for a conduct that constitutes a criminal offence punishable 
Forfeiture Disputes. University of Kansas Law Review, v. 66, n. 2, p. 399-426, 
2017, pp. 401-403. 
4 ALBIN, Laurel. Notes: Constitutional Limitations of Civil in Rem Forfei-
ture and the Double Jeopardy Dilemma: Civil in Rem Forfeiture Consti-
tutes Punishment and Is Subject to Excessive Fines Analysis. Aravanis v. 
Somerset County, 339 Md. 644, 664 A.2d 888 (1995), Cert. Denied, 116 S. 
Ct. 916 (1996). University of Baltimore Law Review, v. 26, n. 1, p. 155-199, 
1996, pp. 159-160. 
5 PIMENTEL, David. Forfeitures and the Eighth Amendment: A Practical Ap-
proach to the Excessive Fines Clause as a Check on Government Seizures. 
Harvard Law & Policy Review, v. 11, n. 2, p. 541-584, 2017, p. 545; BATRA, Ri-
shi. Resolving Civil Forfeiture Disputes, op. cit., p. 407; TAIFA, Nkechi. Civil 
Forfeiture vs. Civil Liberties. New York Law School Law Review, v. 39, n. 1–2, 
p. 95-120, 1994, pp. 98-99; JOHNSON, Barry L. Purging the Cruel and Unusu-
al: The Autonomous Excessive Fines Clause and Desert-Based Constitutional 
Limits on Forfeiture after United States v. Bajakajian, op. cit., pp. 465-466. 
6 Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921). 
7 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 274 (1996); ALBIN, Laurel. Notes: Con-
stitutional Limitations of Civil in Rem Forfeiture and the Double Jeopardy 
Dilemma: Civil in Rem Forfeiture Constitutes Punishment and Is Subject to 
Excessive Fines Analysis. Aravanis v. Somerset County, 339 Md. 644, 664 
A.2d 888 (1995), Cert. Denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996), op. cit., p. 161. 
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by imprisonment and, separately, bringing a civil forfeiture proceeding 
against the property used in such prohibited conduct.8 
Because civil forfeiture is declared in a civil proceeding without 
the traditional safeguards of criminal law9 it has been pointed out that 
the current state of civil forfeiture statutes violate several constitutional 
guarantees, being thereby criticised from a constitutional point of 
view.10 Moreover, since civil forfeiture is declared in a civil proceeding 
the government does not need to prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt.11 Instead, the standard of proof12 in civil litigation is either the 
preponderance of the evidence, which translates into “more-likely-than-
not”,13 or clear and convincing evidence, which could be translated as 
much-more-likely-than-not.14 
8 NELSON, Caleb. The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture. Yale Law Journal, v. 
125, n. 8, p. 2446-2518, 2016, p. 2490.
9 For instance, Andrew Subin remarks that in civil forfeiture proceedings the 
property owner is not entitled to a court appointed attorney and even it is 
unclear whether the owner has the right to a jury. See SUBIN, Andrew L. The 
Double Jeopardy Implications of In Rem Forfeiture of Crime-Related Prop-
erty: The Gradual Realization of a Constitutional Violation. Seattle University 
Law Review, v. 19, n. 2, p. 253-288, 1996, p. 253-254. 
10 TAIFA, Nkechi. Civil Forfeiture vs. Civil Liberties, op. cit., p. 95. 
11 BATRA, Rishi. Resolving Civil Forfeiture Disputes, op. cit., p. 407; SUB-
IN, Andrew L. The Double Jeopardy Implications of In Rem Forfeiture of 
Crime-Related Property: The Gradual Realization of a Constitutional Viola-
tion, op. cit., pp. 253-254. 
12 The Supreme Court has defined the standard of proof as “the degree of cer-
tainty by which the factfinder must be persuaded of a factual conclusion to 
find in favor of the party bearing the burden of persuasion”. See Microsoft 
Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 564 U.S. 91, 100 (note 4) (2011).
13 Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984); SCHWARTZ, David L., 
and SEAMAN, Christopher B. Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Ex-
periment from Patent Law. Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, v. 26, n. 2, p. 
429-480, 2013, p. 435. 
14 JAMES, Fleming. Burdens of Proof. Virginia Law Review, v. 47, n. 1, p. 51-70, 
1961, p. 54; SCHWARTZ, David L., and SEAMAN, Christopher B. Standards 
of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Experiment from Patent Law, op. cit., pp. 435-
437; CLERMONT, Kevin M. Procedure’s Magical Number Three Psychologi-
cal Bases for Standards of Decision. Cornell Law Review, v. 72, n. 6, p. 1115-
1156, 1987, p. 1119.
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One of the constitutional debates regarding civil forfeiture 
concerns the question whether the double jeopardy clause precludes 
the government from bringing parallel civil forfeiture proceedings and 
criminal prosecutions for the same offence.15 
Since there is currently a tendency to include civil forfeiture 
mechanisms in national legal systems, studying the case law of the United 
States Supreme Court on this matter is relevant because the United States 
is probably the legal system in which civil forfeiture has been further 
analysed and discussed. The present article, therefore, aims to study the 
evolution of the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States on 
the constitutionality of parallel civil forfeiture proceedings and criminal 
prosecutions under the double jeopardy clause, analysing the current state 
of the jurisprudence and its possible further developments. 
1.  EVOLUtiOn Of thE casE Law Of thE sUpREME cOURt On 
thE cOnstitUtiOnaLity Of paRaLLEL ciViL fORfEitURE 
pROcEEdinGs and cRiMinaL pROsEcUtiOns UndER thE dOUBLE 
jEOpaRdy cLaUsE
The Fifth Amendment provision against double jeopardy is one 
of the basic protections afforded by the United States Constitution.16 The 
Fifth Amendment reads in part: “Nor shall any person be subject for the 
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”.
Even though the wording of the double jeopardy clause could 
suggest that it only applies to proceedings of capital offences, since Ex 
parte Lange the Supreme Court has held that the constitutional provision 
applies to all cases where a second criminal punishment is attempted to 
be inflicted for the same offence.17 
15 SUBIN, Andrew L. The Double Jeopardy Implications of In Rem Forfeiture of 
Crime-Related Property: The Gradual Realization of a Constitutional Viola-
tion, op. cit., pp. 255-256. 
16 SIGLER, Jay A. Federal Double Jeopardy Policy. Vanderbilt Law Review, v. 19, 
n. 2, p. 375-405, 1966, p. 375. 
17 Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 173 (1873). See also Hudson v. United States, 
522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997); NOLAN, Patrick S. Double Jeopardy’s Multipun-
ishment Protection and Regulation of Civil Sanctions after United States v. 
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Made applicable to the states in Benton v. Maryland through the 
Fourteenth Amendment,18 the Supreme Court has recognised that the double 
jeopardy clause provides three different protections: “It protects against a 
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against 
a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects 
against multiple punishments for the same offense”.19 With reference to 
the prohibition of multiple punishments, the Supreme Court recognised it 
in Ex parte Lange,20 when the Court affirmed that there was no doubt that 
the Constitution “was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being 
twice punished for the same offence as from being twice tried for it”.21
Regarding the underlying policies of these three protections, in 
Green v. United States, the Supreme Court stated: “The underlying idea, 
one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of 
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should 
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an 
Ursery. Marquette Law Review, v. 80, n. 4, p. 1081-1116, 1997, p. 1086; LIM-
BAUGH, Stephen. The Case of Ex Parte Lange (Or How the Double Jeopardy 
Clause Lost Its Life or Limb). American Criminal Law Review, v. 36, n. 1, p. 
53-86, 1999, p. 54; RUDSTEIN, David. Double Jeopardy: A Reference Guide to 
the United States Constitution. Praeger, 2004, p. 54. 
18 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969).
19 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). See also United States 
v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975); Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. 
Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 306-307 (1984); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 516 
(1990); United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993); United States v. 
Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 273 (1996); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 
106 (2003); HENNING, Peter J. Precedents in a Vacuum: The Supreme Court 
Continues to Tinker with Double Jeopardy. American Criminal Law Review, v. 
31, n. 1, p. 1-72, 1993, p. 8; ANIELAK, Eric Michael. Double Jeopardy: Pro-
tection against Multiple Punishments. Missouri Law Review, v. 61, n. 1, p. 169-
184, 1996, p. 171; WELLS, Adam C. Multiple-Punishment and the Double 
Jeopardy Clause: The United States v. Ursery Decision. St. John’s Law Review, 
v. 71, n. 1, p. 153-172, 1997, p. 161.
20 CARLTON, Christopher W. Cumulative Sentences for One Criminal Trans-
action Under the Double Jeopardy Clause: Whalen v. United States. Cornell 
Law Review, v. 66, n. 4, p. 819-841, 1981, p. 821; NOLAN, Patrick S. Double 
Jeopardy’s Multipunishment Protection and Regulation of Civil Sanctions af-
ter United States v. Ursery, op. cit., p. 1085. 
21 Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 173 (1873). See also United States v. Benz, 282 
U.S. 304, 307-308 (1931). 
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alleged offence, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and 
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and 
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent 
he may be found guilty”.22 
When after a criminal conviction the government seeks to impose 
a civil sanction on the same defendant for the same conduct, the protection 
against multiple punishments is called into question.23 For the double 
jeopardy clause to apply in civil forfeiture proceedings two requirements 
should be met. 
In the first place, both the criminal conviction and the civil 
forfeiture should be “for the same offence”. In Blockburger v. United 
States, the Supreme Court established the same elements test, commonly 
referred as the Blockburger test.24 In this case, the defendant was charged 
with five counts and the jury convicted him on the second, third and 
fifth counts only. All these counts charged a sale of drugs to the same 
purchaser: the second count charged a sale on a specified day of ten grains 
of the drug not in or from the original stamped package; the third count 
charged a sale on the following day of eight grains of the drug not in or 
from the original stamped package; and the fifth count charged the latter 
sale also as having been made not in pursuance of a written order of the 
purchaser as required by the statute. The court sentenced the defendant 
to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of $2,000 on each count.25 
22 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188 (1957). See also Benton v. 
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-796 (1969); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 
332, 343 (1975); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370 (1975); Burks v. 
United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978); United States v. Di Francesco, 449 U.S. 
117, 127-128 (1980); Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498-499 (1984); Morris 
v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237, 247 (1986); Blueford v. Arkansas, 566 U.S. 599, 
605 (2012), among others.
23 SUMMERS, Brian L. Double Jeopardy: Rethinking the Parameters of the Mul-
tiplicity Prohibition. Ohio State Law Journal, v. 56, n. 5, p. 1595-1618, 1995, 
p. 1595; ALBIN, Laurel. Notes: Constitutional Limitations of Civil in Rem 
Forfeiture and the Double Jeopardy Dilemma: Civil in Rem Forfeiture Con-
stitutes Punishment and Is Subject to Excessive Fines Analysis. Aravanis v. 
Somerset County, 339 Md. 644, 664 A.2d 888 (1995), Cert. Denied, 116 S. Ct. 
916 (1996), op. cit., p. 186. 
24 Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977).
25 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301 (1932).
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The question the Supreme Court had to resolve was whether the 
defendant had been convicted twice for the same offence. The Court held 
that “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two 
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether 
there are two offences or only one, is whether each provision requires proof 
of a fact which the other does not”.26 The test emphasizes the elements 
of the two offences, since each of them must require something that the 
other does not in order to be regarded as different offences.27 If each of 
the offences requires proof of a fact that the other does not, they should 
be deemed as separate offences, notwithstanding a substantial overlap 
in the proof offered to establish the crimes.28
In the second place, for the double jeopardy clause to apply to civil 
forfeiture proceedings the civil forfeiture sought by the government should 
constitute criminal punishment.29 Due to the difficulties to clearly define 
the notion of criminal punishment this second requirement is probably the 
one that more discussion has generated. At the same time, the case law of 
the Supreme Court on this topic has not been at all exempt from critics. 
In the following it will be studied the evolution of the case law 
of the Supreme Court on this last requirement. 
1.1. vaRIous Items of PeRsonal PRoPeRty et al. v. unIted states.
The first case on the constitutionality of parallel civil forfeiture 
proceedings and criminal prosecutions under the double jeopardy clause 
was Various Items of Personal Property et al. v. United States, decided 
in 1931. In this case, the government brought a civil forfeiture action to 
26 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
27 AMAR, Akhil, and Jonathan L. Marcus. Double Jeopardy Law after Rodney 
King. Columbia Law Review, v. 95, n. 1, p. 1-59, 1995, p. 28; MERKL, Taryn A. 
The Federalization of Criminal Law and Double Jeopardy. Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review, v. 31, n. 1, p. 175-208, 1999, p. 189. 
28 Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 (note 17) (1975); Lewis v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 155, 176-177 (Scalia, J., concurring) (1998). 
29 SOLOMON, Matthew C. The Perils of Minimalism: United States v. Bajakajian 
in the Wake of the Supreme Court’s Civil Double Jeopardy Excursion Note. 
Georgetown Law Journal, v. 87, n. 3, 849-886, 1999, p. 855. 
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forfeit a distillery, warehouse and denaturing plant on the ground that the 
defendant had conducted its distilling business with intent to defraud, and 
had defrauded, the government of the related tax.30 The defendant had 
previously been convicted for the same acts indicated in the civil action.31 
In the first place, the Supreme Court explained that even though 
in United States v. La Franca it had held that a civil action to recover a 
penalty was punitive in character and therefore was barred by the prior 
conviction of the defendant for the same transaction,32 the situation in 
the present case was different, because it was about a civil proceeding to 
forfeit property used in committing a criminal offence.33 Where a statute 
has provided a civil proceeding to forfeit property used in committing a 
criminal offence the property is “primarily considered as the offender, or 
rather the offense is attached primarily to the thing; and this, whether the 
offense be malum prohibitum, or malum in se”.34 In contrast, “in a criminal 
prosecution it is the wrongdoer in person who is proceeded against, 
convicted and punished”.35 The Supreme Court therefore concluded that 
the double jeopardy clause did not apply to this case because the civil 
forfeiture was not part of the punishment for the criminal offence.36
1.2. helveRInG v. mItchell: the statutoRy constRuctIon analysIs.
A fundamental decision regarding the notion of criminal 
punishment was Helvering v. Mitchell. In this case, the defendant was tried 
30 Various Items of Personal Property et al. v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 578 
(1931).
31 Various Items of Personal Property et al. v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 579 
(1931).
32 United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 575-577 (1931).
33 Various Items of Personal Property et al. v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 580 
(1931).
34 Various Items of Personal Property et al. v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 580 
(1931).
35 Various Items of Personal Property et al. v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 
(1931).
36 Various Items of Personal Property et al. v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 
(1931).
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for tax evasion and acquitted by the jury. Afterwards, the tax authorities 
imposed him a civil penalty which amounted to a fifty-percent of his tax 
deficiency.37 The defendant contended that the civil penalty was barred 
under the double jeopardy clause because it was not a tax sanction, but 
rather a criminal penalty intended as punishment.38
In the first place, the Supreme Court recognised that a civil 
sanction following a criminal prosecution may be barred by the double 
jeopardy clause. However, this will only happen if the civil sanction 
constitutes criminal punishment.39 The Supreme Court then explained that 
since Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect 
to the same act the question regarding the nature of the sanction is one of 
statutory construction.40 By applying canons of statutory construction, the 
Court concluded that the statute at stake was intended as civil in nature. 
The Court stated that the sanction was provided as a safeguard for the 
protection of the revenue and to reimburse the government the expense 
of investigation and the loss resulting from the fraud of the taxpayer.41 
Moreover, the circumstance that Congress provided in a civil statute a 
distinctly civil procedure for the collection of the additional tax indicated 
that the sanction in question was intended as civil in nature.42 
The statutory construction analysis of Helvering v. Mitchell 
became the standard for the subsequent cases involving the application 
of the double jeopardy clause to parallel criminal and civil convictions.43
37 Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 395 (1938).
38 Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398-399 (1938). 
39 Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398-399 (1938); NOLAN, Patrick S. Dou-
ble Jeopardy’s Multipunishment Protection and Regulation of Civil Sanctions 
after United States v. Ursery, op. cit., p. 1087. 
40 Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
41 Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938).
42 Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402 (1938); ANIELAK, Eric Michael. 
Double Jeopardy: Protection against Multiple Punishments, p. 172. 
43 SUMMERS, Brian L. Double Jeopardy: Rethinking the Parameters of the Mul-
tiplicity Prohibition. Ohio State Law Journal, v. 56, n. 5, p. 1595-1618, 1995, 
p. 1595; The statutory construction analysis was subsequently applied in 
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943) and Rex Trailer Co., 
Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956), among others. 
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1.3.  cIvIl foRfeItuRe undeR the statutoRy constRuctIon analysIs: 
one lot emeRald cut stones v. unIted states and unIted states 
v. one assoRtment of 89 fIReaRms. 
In 1972 the Supreme Court handed down its decision in One 
Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States. In this case, the defendant had 
been tried and acquitted of charges for having entered the United States 
without declaring to the customs authority one lot of emerald cut stones 
and one ring.44 Following the criminal trial, the government brought a civil 
forfeiture action of the goods involved. The defendant filled a motion to 
dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that his previous acquittal 
barred the forfeiture procedure. 
After recalling that Congress may impose both a criminal and a 
civil sanction in respect to the same conduct45 and that the question of 
whether a given sanction is either civil or criminal is one of statutory 
construction,46 the Supreme Court held that the forfeiture in question 
was civil and remedial.47 The Court noted that the forfeiture was intended 
to aid in the enforcement of tariff regulations. It prevented forbidden 
merchandise from circulating in the market and, by its monetary penalty, 
it provided a reasonable form of liquidated damages for violation of 
the inspection provisions and served to reimburse the Government for 
investigation and enforcement expenses.48 Moreover, the Court stated 
that the civil forfeiture brought to recover the smuggled goods was not so 
unreasonable or excessive that it transformed “what was clearly intended 
as a civil penalty into a criminal penalty”.49 
In 1984, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in United 
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms. In this case, the defendant was 
indicted and acquitted of violating the Gun Control Act by knowingly 
engaging in the business of dealing in firearms without a license. Following 
44 One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
45 One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972).
46 One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972).
47 One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972).
48 One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972).
49 One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972).
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the criminal acquittal, the government instituted a forfeiture action of the 
seized firearms. On the basis of his earlier acquittal, the defendant argued 
that the forfeiture procedure was barred by the double jeopardy clause.50 
The Court underlined once again that, unless the forfeiture has 
intended as punishment, the double jeopardy clause does not applicable.51 
In order to determine the nature of the forfeiture the Court applied the 
two-prong analysis previously developed in Ward v. United States.52 
According to the ruling in Ward, the inquiry on this matter is 
compounded of two levels: firstly, a court should determine whether the 
legislature, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either 
expressly or impliedly that the sanction was intended to be civil in nature. 
Where Congress has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, the 
second step of the inquiry is to ascertain whether the statutory scheme is 
“so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention”.53 In 
making this latter determination, the Court stated that the seven criteria 
that it had established in its decision Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez 
are useful guideposts: (i) whether the sanction involves an affirmative 
disability or restraint; (ii) whether it has historically been regarded 
as a punishment; (iii) whether it comes into play only on a finding of 
scienter; (iv) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of 
punishment -retribution and deterrence-; (v) whether the behaviour to 
which it applies is already a crime;54 (vi) whether an alternative purpose to 
50 United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 356 (1984).
51 United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 (1984). 
52 United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-249 (1980); MARTIN, Janeice T. 
Final Jeopardy: Merging the Civil and Criminal Rounds in the Punishment 
Game. Florida Law Review, v. 46, n. 4, p. 661-686, 1994, p. 667; ABBOTT, 
Nelson T. United States v. Halper: Making Double Jeopardy Available in Civil 
Actions. BYU Journal of Public Law, v. 6, n. 3, p. 551-574, 1992, pp. 556-557. 
53 United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-249 (1980); MELENYZER, Lisa. 
Double Jeopardy Protection from Civil Sanctions after Hudson v. United 
States. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, v. 89, n. 3, p. 1007-1046, 
1999, p. 1015; MARTIN, Janeice T. Final Jeopardy: Merging the Civil and 
Criminal Rounds in the Punishment Game, op. cit., pp. 667-667. 
54 Regarding the application of this criterion, the Court cited Lipke v. Lederer, 
259 U.S. 557, 562 (1922); United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572-573 
(1931); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935).
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which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (vii) whether 
it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.55 
Regarding the first prong of the analysis, the Court concluded that 
Congress designed the forfeiture in question as a remedial civil sanction.56 
It noted that the civil forfeiture was not intended as punishment, but 
rather its purpose was to discourage unregulated commerce in firearms, 
keeping dangerous weapons out of the hands of unlicensed dealers.57 
Concerning the second prong of the analysis, the Court observed that only 
one of the Kennedy criteria -whether the behaviour to which the penalty 
applies is already a crime- supported the position of the defendant that 
the forfeiture in question was a criminal penalty. However, this indication 
was not sufficient, since Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil 
sanction in respect to the same conduct.58 The Court thus concluded that 
the forfeiture at issue was civil in nature.59 
1.4.  the constItutIonalIty of cIvIl foRfeItuRe undeR the excessIve 
fInes clause: austIn v. unIted states. 
Even though Austin v. United States was not a double jeopardy 
case, it is a cardinal case on the matter regarding the constitutionality of 
civil forfeiture, since the Supreme Court characterised a civil forfeiture as 
punishment for purposes of the excessive fines clause of the Amendment.60 
In Austin, the defendant was convicted of possessing cocaine 
with intent to distribute and was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. 
55 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963); HILDY, John. 
Fifth Amendment--Double Jeopardy and the Dangerous Drug Tax. Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology, v. 85, n. 4, p. 936-961, 1995, p. 940.
56 United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363 (1984). 
57 United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363-364 
(1984).
58 United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365 (1984). 
59 United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366 (1984).
60 In the same term Austin was decided, the Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in Alexander v. United States, where it characterised a criminal for-
feiture as punishment for purposes of the excessive fines clause. See Alexan-
der v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 558-559 (1993).
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Subsequently, the government filed an in rem action seeking forfeiture of 
the mobile home and the auto body shop of the defendant.61 The District 
Court rejected the argument of the defendant that forfeiture of his properties 
would violate the excessive fines clause and granted summary judgment on 
the basis of an affidavit from a police officer that the defendant had brought 
two grams of cocaine from the mobile home to the body shop in order to 
consummate a prearranged sale there. The Court of Appeals upheld the 
decision of the District Court.62 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
resolve the question whether the forfeiture at issue constituted punishment 
and thus it was subjected to the Eighth Amendment.63 
The Supreme Court firstly noted that unlike other provisions 
of the Bill of Rights, such as the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth 
Amendment or the protections provided by the Sixth Amendment, which 
are expressly confined to criminal cases, neither the text nor the history 
of the Eighth Amendment include such a limitation.64 The purpose of 
the Eighth Amendment, stated the Court, was to limit the power of the 
government to punish.65 Regarding the excessive fines clause, it limits 
the power of the government to extract payments as punishment for 
some offence.66 Therefore, since both civil and criminal sanctions may 
advance punitive as well as remedial goals, for purposes of the excessive 
fines clause the Court affirmed that the relevant question is not whether 
the forfeiture in question is civil or criminal, but rather whether it is 
punishment.67 The Court next analysed the historical development of 
61 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 604 (1993).
62 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 605 (1993); WOOD, Cynthia. Asset, 
Forfeiture and the Excessive Fines Clause: An Epilogue to Austin v. United 
States. Wake Forest Law Review, v. 29, n. 4, p. 1357-1404, 1994, p. 1378.
63 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 606 (1993).
64 Supreme Court of the United States, Austin v. United States, 607-608 [1993]; 
JOHNSON, Barry L. Purging the Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous Exces-
sive Fines Clause and Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on Forfeiture after 
United States v. Bajakajian, op. cit., p. 472. 
65 Supreme Court of the United States, Austin v. United States, 609 [1993], cit-
ing Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, 275 [1989].
66 Supreme Court of the United States, Austin v. United States, 609-610 [1993].
67 Supreme Court of the United States, Austin v. United States, 610 [1993]; 
GEORGE, W. David. Finally, an Eye for an Eye: The Supreme Court Lets the 
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civil forfeiture, reaching the conclusion that forfeiture generally and 
civil forfeiture in particular historically have been understood, at least in 
part, as punishment.68 Regarding the forfeiture at issue, the Court found 
nothing to contradict this historical understanding.69 For instance, the 
Court noted that the forfeiture in question expressly provided an innocent 
owner defence, an exemption that serves to focus the inquiry on the 
culpability of the owner.70 Moreover, when Congress established the 
forfeiture up for discussion it argued that traditional criminal sanctions 
had been inadequate to deter and punish the enormously profitable trade 
in dangerous drugs, hence additional measures were necessary.71 
Considering the historical understanding of forfeiture as 
punishment, the clear focus of the forfeiture at stake on the culpability 
of the owner and the evidence that Congress understood it as serving to 
deter and punish, the Supreme Court held that the forfeiture in question 
constituted punishment for purposes of the excessive fines clause.72 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court refused the invitation of the defendant 
to establish a multifactor test for determining whether a forfeiture is 
constitutionally excessive. The Court argued that prudence dictated to 
Punishment Fit the Crime in Austin v. United States. Baylor Law Review, v. 
46, n. 2, p. 509-524, 1994, p. 515; SUBIN, Andrew L. The Double Jeopardy 
Implications of In Rem Forfeiture of Crime-Related Property: The Gradual 
Realization of a Constitutional Violation, op. cit., p. 261. 
68 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618 (1993); HENNING, Peter J. Prec-
edents in a Vacuum: The Supreme Court Continues to Tinker with Double 
Jeopardy, op. cit., p. 65; SACKETT, Robin M. The Impact of Austin v. United 
States: Extending Constitutional Protections to Claimants in Civil Forfeiture 
Proceedings. Golden Gate University Law Review, v. 24, n. 2, p. 495-522, 1994, 
p. 509; WOOD, Cynthia. Asset, Forfeiture and the Excessive Fines Clause: An 
Epilogue to Austin v. United States, op. cit., p. 1379. 
69 SACKETT, Robin M. The Impact of Austin v. United States: Extending Constitu-
tional Protections to Claimants in Civil Forfeiture Proceedings, op. cit., p. 510. 
70 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 619 (1993).
71 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 620 (1993); GEORGE, W. David. Final-
ly, an Eye for an Eye: The Supreme Court Lets the Punishment Fit the Crime 
in Austin v. United States, op. cit., p. 515. 
72 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621-622 (1993); HENNING, Peter J. 
Precedents in a Vacuum: The Supreme Court Continues to Tinker with Dou-
ble Jeopardy, op. cit., p. 18. 
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allow the lower courts to consider that question in the first instance.73 
Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remanded the case for a determination of proportionality.74 
1.5. ReveRsInG the dIRectIon: unIted states v. uRseRy.
After Austin v. United States there was great expectancy for 
knowing the next decision of the Supreme Court on the constitutionality 
of civil forfeiture. The subsequent decision delivered by the Court 
on this matter was United States v. Ursery, a case in which the Court 
held that a civil forfeiture did not constitute punishment for double 
jeopardy purposes, reversing thereby the direction of the development 
of the case law.75 
In Ursery, the Court consolidated two cases to determine whether 
a civil forfeiture in addition to a criminal prosecution for the same offence 
violated the double jeopardy clause.76 In the first case, the police discovered 
a marijuana manufacturing operation in the home of the defendant, Guy 
Ursery. The government instituted a civil forfeiture proceeding to recoup 
the residence because it was used in the manufacturing operation. The 
defendant settled the forfeiture suit by paying the federal government 
$13,250.167. Subsequently, the defendant was indicted and convicted 
of manufacturing marijuana.77 The defendant appealed his criminal 
conviction, arguing that the criminal penalty constituted a second 
73 Supreme Court of the United States, Austin v. United States, 622-623 [1993]; 
REINHART, Douglas. Applying the Eighth Amendment to Civil Forfeiture Af-
ter Austin v. United States: Excessiveness and Proportionality, op. cit., p. 243. 
74 Supreme Court of the United States, Austin v. United States, 623 [1993].
75 MELENYZER, Lisa. Double Jeopardy Protection from Civil Sanctions after 
Hudson v. United States, op. cit., 1021; SOLOMON, Matthew C. The Perils of 
Minimalism: United States v. Bajakajian in the Wake of the Supreme Court’s 
Civil Double Jeopardy Excursion Note, op. cit., p. 864.
76 WATKINS, Amy E. Double Jeopardy Clause - Government May Bring Parallel 
Criminal Prosecution and In Rem Forfeiture Actions without Violating the 
Double Jeopardy Clause Survey: Fifth Amendment. Seton Hall Constitutional 
Law Journal, v. 7, n. 1, 287-292, 1996, p. 287. 
77 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 271 (1996).
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impermissible punishment in violation of the double jeopardy clause.78 
In the second case, United States v. $405,089.23 in U. S. Currency et al., the 
defendants were convicted of conspiracy to aid and abet the manufacture 
of methamphetamine, conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, and 
numerous counts of money laundering.79 The government also instituted 
a contemporaneous civil forfeiture proceeding against property owned 
by the defendants that was used in their illegal operations.80 After the 
conclusion of the criminal procedure, the District Court granted the motion 
of the government for summary judgment in the forfeiture proceeding. 
The defendants appealed the decision on double jeopardy grounds.81 In 
both cases, Ursery and $405,089.23, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
and held a civil forfeiture may be brought in conjunction with a criminal 
trial without violating the double jeopardy clause.82 
The Supreme Court firstly highlighted that in a long line of cases, 
composed of Various Items of Personal Property et al., One Lot Emerald 
Cut Stones and One Assortment of 89 Firearms,83 it had consistently 
concluded that in rem civil forfeiture is a remedial civil sanction and 
therefore does not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes.84 
The Court then noted that none of its previous decisions had overruled 
the well-established teaching of Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, 
and 89 Firearms.85 Moreover, the Court remarked that while Austin had 
78 VINES, J. Andrew. United States v. Ursery: The Supreme Court Refuses to 
Extend Double Jeopardy Protection to Civil in Rem Forfeiture. Arkansas Law 
Review, v. 50, n. 4, p. 797-840, 1997, p. 803. 
79 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 271 (1996).
80 NOLAN, Patrick S. Double Jeopardy’s Multipunishment Protection and 
Regulation of Civil Sanctions after United States v. Ursery, op. cit., p. 1101. 
81 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 272 (1996).
82 WATKINS, Amy E. Double Jeopardy Clause - Government May Bring Parallel 
Criminal Prosecution and In Rem Forfeiture Actions without Violating the 
Double Jeopardy Clause Survey: Fifth Amendment, op. cit., p. 288.
83 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 274-278 (1996). 
84 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 278 (1996); VINES, J. Andrew. United 
States v. Ursery: The Supreme Court Refuses to Extend Double Jeopardy Pro-
tection to Civil in Rem Forfeiture, op. cit., p. 825. 
85 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 282 (1996); VINES, J. Andrew. Unit-
ed States v. Ursery: The Supreme Court Refuses to Extend Double Jeopardy 
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dealt with the question whether civil forfeiture constitutes punishment 
for purposes of the excessive fines clause, Ursery deals with another 
issue: whether civil forfeiture constitutes punishment for purposes of 
the double jeopardy clause.86
Afterwards, the Supreme Court examined the forfeitures in 
question under the two-prong analysis of Ward.87 Regarding the first 
part of the analysis, the Supreme Court found several characteristics that 
supported the conclusion that Congress had intended these forfeitures 
to be civil in nature.88 For instance, the Court noted that forfeitures at 
issue were in rem, just like customs laws forfeitures,89 being structured 
to be impersonal by targeting the property itself.90 Moreover, the Court 
observed that “actual notice of the impending forfeiture is unnecessary 
when the Government cannot identify any party with an interest in 
the seized article”.91 Moving to the second step of the analysis, the 
Supreme Court found little evidence suggesting that the forfeitures 
in question were so punitive either in form or effect as to render 
them criminal despite the intent of Congress. The Court noted that 
the civil forfeiture at stake served important non-punitive goals, such 
as guaranteeing that persons do not profit from their illegal acts, or 
encouraging property owners to take care in managing their property, 
ensuring that they will not permit that property to be used in illegal 
activities.92 In addition, the Court remarked that forfeitures at issue 
did not require proving scienter.93 
Protection to Civil in Rem Forfeiture, op. cit., p. 825. 
86 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 288 (1996).
87 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 288 (1996); VINES, J. Andrew. United 
States v. Ursery: The Supreme Court Refuses to Extend Double Jeopardy Pro-
tection to Civil in Rem Forfeiture, op. cit., p. 825; MELENYZER, Lisa. Double 
Jeopardy Protection from Civil Sanctions after Hudson v. United States, op. 
cit., p. 1022. 
88 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 288 (1996).
89 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 288-289 (1996).
90 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 289 (1996).
91 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 289 (1996).
92 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290-291 (1996). 
93 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 291 (1996).
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled that civil forfeiture does 
not constitute criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes.94 
Consequently, the double jeopardy clause does not bar the imposition 
of both a criminal penalty and a civil forfeiture for the same conduct.95
2. REcaLLinG thE ExcEssiVE finEs cLaUsE
The current state of the case law of the Supreme Court on the 
constitutionality of parallel civil forfeiture proceedings and criminal 
prosecutions under the double jeopardy clause is that civil forfeiture 
does not constitute criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 
Thus, the Fifth Amendment does not preclude the government from 
bringing parallel civil forfeiture proceedings and criminal prosecutions 
for the same offence. 
Nevertheless, Ursery neither overruled nor modified the ruling 
in Austin v. United States. Therefore, even though the double jeopardy 
clause does not prevent the government from bringing parallel civil 
forfeiture proceeding and criminal prosecutions for the same offence, 
civil forfeiture is still limited by the excessive fines clause of the Eighth 
Amendment,96 which provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”. 
The Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791, directly from the 
English Bill of Rights of 1689.97 The history indicates that the framers 
intended the entire amendment to act as a limit on the power of the 
94 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 270-271 (1996); WELLS, Adam C. Mul-
tiple-Punishment and the Double Jeopardy Clause: The United States v. Urs-
ery Decision, op. cit., p. 161; NELSON, Caleb. The Constitutionality of Civil 
Forfeiture, op. cit., p. 2491.
95 NOLAN, Patrick S. Double Jeopardy’s Multipunishment Protection and Reg-
ulation of Civil Sanctions after United States v. Ursery, op. cit., p. 1111. 
96 PIMENTEL, David. Forfeitures and the Eighth Amendment: A Practical Ap-
proach to the Excessive Fines Clause as a Check on Government Seizures, op. 
cit., p. 555. 
97 GRANUCCI Anthony. Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The 
Original Meaning. California Law Review, v. 57, n. 4, p. 839-865, 1969, p. 840.
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government to punish.98 The Eighth Amendment contains three different 
prohibitions: a prohibition of excessive bail, a prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishments, which is concerned with matters such as the duration 
or conditions of confinement, and a prohibition of excessive fines, which 
limits the power of the government to extract payments as punishment 
for some offence.99 The Supreme Court has recently underlined that the 
excessive fines clause is an incorporated protection applicable to the States 
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.100 
Prior to Austin, the Supreme Court had only considered the 
excessive fines clause in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal. 
In this case, the Supreme Court held that the excessive fines clause does 
not apply to disputes between private parties, stating that the excessive 
fines clause “was intended to limit only those fines directly imposed by, 
and payable to, the government”.101
Despite the importance of the ruling in Austin that the excessive 
fines clause applies to civil forfeiture, the Court declined to establish a test 
98 Accordingly, Reinhart states that analysis under the excessive fines clause 
should be similar to that required by the cruel and unusual punishments 
clause and the excessive bail clause. REINHART, Douglas. Applying the 
Eighth Amendment to Civil Forfeiture After Austin v. United States: Exces-
siveness and Proportionality, op. cit., pp. 252-253.
99 Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 558 (1993); ALBIN, Laurel. Notes: 
Constitutional Limitations of Civil in Rem Forfeiture and the Double Jeopar-
dy Dilemma: Civil in Rem Forfeiture Constitutes Punishment and Is Subject 
to Excessive Fines Analysis. Aravanis v. Somerset County, 339 Md. 644, 664 
A.2d 888 (1995), Cert. Denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996), op. cit., p. 156. See also 
Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989); Aus-
tin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-610 (1993); United States v. Bajakajian, 
524 U.S. 321, 328 (1998).
100 Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S., 7 (2019).
101 Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 268 (1989); 
GEORGE, W. David. Finally, an Eye for an Eye: The Supreme Court Lets the 
Punishment Fit the Crime in Austin v. United States, op. cit., p. 515; ALBIN, 
Laurel. Notes: Constitutional Limitations of Civil in Rem Forfeiture and the 
Double Jeopardy Dilemma: Civil in Rem Forfeiture Constitutes Punishment 
and Is Subject to Excessive Fines Analysis. Aravanis v. Somerset County, 339 
Md. 644, 664 A.2d 888 (1995), Cert. Denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996), op. cit., 
p. 166; SOLOMON, Matthew C. The Perils of Minimalism: United States v. Ba-
jakajian in the Wake of the Supreme Court’s Civil Double Jeopardy Excursion 
Note, op. cit., p. 871. 
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for determining excessiveness in this specific context.102 Due to the lack of 
direction given by the Supreme Court in Austin, lower courts developed 
their own tests, which tend to emphasize either an “instrumentality” or a 
“proportionality” approach.103 Under the first test, the relevant question is 
whether there is a close enough relationship between the property and the 
offence to render the property, under traditional standards, guilty and hence 
forfeitable.104 On the contrary, the proportionality test utilises the criteria 
established by the Supreme Court with regard to the other prohibitions 
contained in the Eighth Amendment. Recognising that the Eight Amendment 
establishes parallel limitations on bail, fines and other punishments,105 lower 
courts have applied the analysis of the Supreme Court on the excessive bail 
and cruel and unusual punishments clauses to the excessive fines clause.106 
2.1. unIted states v. bajaKajIan and the PRoPoRtIonalIty aPPRoach.
Notwithstanding the lack of consensus among lower courts, the 
Supreme Court did not clarify its excessive fines clause case law until 1998, 
102 ALBIN, Laurel. Notes: Constitutional Limitations of Civil in Rem Forfeiture 
and the Double Jeopardy Dilemma: Civil in Rem Forfeiture Constitutes Pun-
ishment and Is Subject to Excessive Fines Analysis. Aravanis v. Somerset 
County, 339 Md. 644, 664 A.2d 888 (1995), Cert. Denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 
(1996), op. cit., p. 167; LIEBER, David. Eighth Amendment--The Excessive 
Fines Clause. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, v. 84, n. 4, p. 805-826, 
1994, p. 823. 
103 JOHNSON, Barry L. Purging the Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous Exces-
sive Fines Clause and Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on Forfeiture after 
United States v. Bajakajian, op. cit., p. 474. 
104 The instrumentality test was announced by Justice Scalia in its concurring 
opinion in Austin. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 628 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (1993).
105 Solem v. Helm. 463 U.S. 277, 289 (1983). See also Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 
___, 3 (2019)
106 ALBIN, Laurel. Notes: Constitutional Limitations of Civil in Rem Forfeiture 
and the Double Jeopardy Dilemma: Civil in Rem Forfeiture Constitutes Pun-
ishment and Is Subject to Excessive Fines Analysis. Aravanis v. Somerset 
County, 339 Md. 644, 664 A.2d 888 (1995), Cert. Denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 
(1996), op. cit., p. 173; JOHNSON, Barry L. Purging the Cruel and Unusual: 
The Autonomous Excessive Fines Clause and Desert-Based Constitutional 
Limits on Forfeiture after United States v. Bajakajian, op. cit., pp. 476-478.
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when it delivered its decision in United States v. Bajakajian,107 declaring 
disproportionate the criminal forfeiture sought by the government under 
the excessive fines clause.108 
In Bajakajian, respondent and his family were waiting at Los 
Angeles International Airport to board a flight abroad. A customs 
inspector approached respondent and his wife and told them that they 
were required to report all money in excess of $10,000. Respondent 
said that he had $8,000 and that his wife had another $7,000, but that 
the family had no additional currency to declare. A search of their 
baggage and personal bags revealed a total of $357,144. The currency 
was seized and respondent was taken into custody.109 The respondent 
was indicted with failing to report that he was transporting more than 
$10,000 outside the United States. The defendant pleaded guilty to the 
failure to report and was convicted. The government sought forfeiture 
of the $357,144 pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 982(a)(1), which provides 
that the court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted for the 
previous offence, shall order the forfeiture of any property involved in 
such offence, or any property traceable to such property.110 Respondent 
elected to have a bench trial on the forfeiture. After the bench trial, 
the trial court found that the entire $357,144 was subject to forfeiture 
because it was “involved in” the offence.111 The court also found that 
“the funds were not connected to any other crime and that respondent 
was transporting the money to repay a lawful debt”.112 Even though 
the relevant statute provided to impose full forfeiture of the property 
involved in the offence, the court concluded that such forfeiture would 
be extraordinarily harsh and grossly disproportionate to the offence in 
107 JOHNSON, Barry L. Purging the Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous Exces-
sive Fines Clause and Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on Forfeiture after 
United States v. Bajakajian, op. cit., p. 478
108 SOLOMON, Matthew C. The Perils of Minimalism: United States v. Bajakajian 
in the Wake of the Supreme Court’s Civil Double Jeopardy Excursion Note, 
op. cit., p. 849. 
109 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324-325 (1998).
110 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 325 (1998).
111 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 325-326 (1998).
112 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 326 (1998).
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question, violating thereby the excessive fines clause. The court instead 
ordered forfeiture of $15,000, in addition to a sentence of three years of 
probation and a fine of $5,000. The government appealed, seeking full 
forfeiture of the seized currency. The Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed.113 Because the judgment of the Court of Appeal invalidated 
a part of an Act of Congress, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.114 
The Supreme Court effortlessly concluded that the forfeiture 
at stake constituted punishment. The Court noted that the forfeiture in 
question was imposed as an additional sanction on a person convicted of 
an offence at the culmination of a criminal proceeding. Accordingly, the 
imposition of the forfeiture at issue required a conviction of an underlying 
offence, not being possible imposing it on an innocent owner.115 
After holding that the forfeiture of the currency constituted 
punishment and that therefore the excessive fines clause was applicable, 
the Supreme Court turned to the question whether the forfeiture was 
excessive. In this regard, the Court held that the touchstone of the 
constitutional inquiry under the excessive fines clause is the principle 
of proportionality. Since the amount of the forfeiture must bear some 
relationship to the gravity of the offence committed by the defendant, 
the Supreme Court ruled that a punitive forfeiture violates the excessive 
fines clause when it is “grossly disproportionate” to the gravity of the 
offence.116 If the amount of the forfeiture is grossly disproportionate to 
the gravity of the offence committed by the defendant, the forfeiture will 
be contrary to the Eighth Amendment.117
113 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 326 (1998).
114 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327 (1998).
115 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 (1998); JOHNSON, Barry L. 
Purging the Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous Excessive Fines Clause and 
Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on Forfeiture after United States v. Baja-
kajian, op. cit., pp. 480-482.
116 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998); PIMENTEL, David. For-
feitures and the Eighth Amendment: A Practical Approach to the Excessive 
Fines Clause as a Check on Government Seizures, op. cit., p. 559; BENNAR-
DO, Kevin. Restitution and the Excessive Fines Clause. Louisiana Law Review, 
v. 77, n. 1, p. 21-45, 2016, p. 32. 
117 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337 (1998); JOHNSON, Barry L. 
Purging the Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous Excessive Fines Clause and 
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Applying the gross disproportionality standard, the Supreme 
Court considered that the offence committed by the defendant was solely 
a reporting offence, whose essence was a failure to report the removal of 
currency from the United States118 and that the violation was unrelated 
to any other illegal activities. Therefore, the conduct of the defendant 
did not fit into the class of persons for whom the statute was principally 
designed: he was not a money launderer, a drug trafficker, or a tax evader.119 
Moreover, the Court noted that the harm that respondent caused was 
minimal, there had not been fraud in the United States and the failure to 
report his currency affected only the government.120 
For the foregoing reasons, the Supreme Court concluded that 
the forfeiture of $357,144 sought by the government would be grossly 
disproportionate to the gravity of the offence committed by the defendant, 
violating thereby the excessive fines clause.121 The Supreme Court upheld 
the $15,000 forfeiture imposed by the district court.122
2.2. analysInG the decIsIon In bajaKajIan.
The decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Bajakajian, 
holding that the right approach in the context of the excessive fines clause 
is the proportionality standard, has two main merits. 
The first merit of the decision is having allowed to overcome the 
situation of uncertainty in lower courts, which were divided between 
the proportionality standard and the instrumentality approach.123 By 
embracing the former approach the Court firmly rejected the latter one.
Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on Forfeiture after United States v. Baja-
kajian, op. cit., pp. 482-483.
118 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337 (1998).
119 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 338 (1998).
120 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 339 (1998).
121 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 339-340 (1998).
122 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 339-340 (1998).
123 JOHNSON, Barry L. Purging the Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous Exces-
sive Fines Clause and Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on Forfeiture after 
United States v. Bajakajian, op. cit., pp. 486.
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The second merit of the decision is having strengthened the 
proportionality approach by making it applicable outside the cruel and 
unusual punishments clause. As the same Supreme Court recognised, the gross 
disproportionality standard was originally articulated in its case law on the 
cruel and unusual punishments clause.124 In Solem v. Helm, decided in 1983, 
the Supreme Court held a straightforward idea: “a criminal sentence must be 
proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted”.125 
The prohibition of imposing “grossly disproportional” punishments and 
fines is a current standard of the Supreme Court constitutional case law. 
In Ewing v. California, decided in 2003, the defendant, while on parole, 
was convicted of felony grand theft for stealing three golf clubs, worth 
$399 apiece. Because the defendant had been previously convicted of 
four serious or violent felonies, the prosecutor alleged and the trial court 
applied the California’s three strikes law, sentencing him to 25 years to life. 
The Supreme Court stated that the Eighth Amendment contains a “narrow 
proportionality principle”, which only forbids extreme sentences that are 
“grossly disproportionate”’ to the crime.126 Regarding the case in question, 
the Court concluded that the sentence of 25 years to life in prison, imposed 
on the defendant for the offense of felony grand theft under the three strikes 
law was not grossly disproportionate, therefore there was no violation of 
the Eighth Amendment.127 
Notwithstanding the significance of the decision in Bajakajian, 
there is one problematic issue that should be critically addressed: the 
threshold of the gross disproportionality standard. 
Besides the standard does not provide clear guidelines to lower 
courts in the application of the excessive fines clause,128 the main 
problem of the standard itself is the demanding threshold that the 
Supreme Court has established. As the Supreme Court recognised in 
124 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998).
125 Solem v. Helm. 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983).
126 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003). See also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 
U.S. 63, 72 (2003).
127 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003).
128 PIMENTEL, David. Forfeitures and the Eighth Amendment: A Practical Ap-
proach to the Excessive Fines Clause as a Check on Government Seizures, op. 
cit., p. 561. 
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Bajakajian, the gross disproportionality standard was borrowed from the 
case law on the cruel and unusual punishments clause. In the context 
of the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments, the extreme 
deference to legislative sentencing determinations represented by the 
demanding threshold of “grossly” has been firstly explained on the 
basis of the wording of the prohibition itself: “cruel and unusual”.129 For 
instance, in Harmelin v. Michigan the Supreme Court held that severe 
mandatory penalties “may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the 
constitutional sense, having being employed in various forms throughout 
our Nation’s history”.130 The extreme deference to legislature on this 
topic was explained by the Supreme Court in Rummel v. Estelle, where 
after noting that outside the context of capital punishment successful 
challenges to disproportional sentences have been exceedingly rare, 
the Court held that the length of terms of imprisonment is mainly a 
matter of legislative prerogative.131
Since the language of the excessive fines clause is not similar at 
all to the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments, the arguments 
to justify the gross disproportionality standard in the former guarantee 
are significantly weaker.132 Although it could seem obvious, the excessive 
fines clause does not refer to grossly excessive fines, but rather it mentions 
excessive fines. Therefore, it seems reasonable to state that due to the 
different wording contained in the Eighth Amendment the threshold 
in the context of the excessive fines clause should be diverse from the 
threshold of the cruel and unusual punishments clause. It could certainly be 
argued that this sole difference of wording between the two constitutional 
prohibitions is not a conclusive argument in order to exclude the gross 
disproportionality standard from the scope of application of the excessive 
fines clause. However, this difference should at least be considered and 
129 JOHNSON, Barry L. Purging the Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous Exces-
sive Fines Clause and Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on Forfeiture after 
United States v. Bajakajian, op. cit., p. 487. 
130 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-995 (1991).
131 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980).
132 JOHNSON, Barry L. Purging the Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous Exces-
sive Fines Clause and Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on Forfeiture after 
United States v. Bajakajian, op. cit., p. 487. 
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explained before concluding that for applying both the cruel and unusual 
punishments clause and the excessive fines clause it is required the same 
threshold. On this matter, the Supreme Court seems to have just imported 
the standard at stake from one clause to another. 
cOncLUsiOns. 
Does the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution precludes the government from bringing 
parallel civil forfeiture proceedings and criminal prosecutions for the 
same offence? 
According to the Supreme Court, the answer is no. The reasoning 
of the Court was set out in United States v. Ursery: because the double 
jeopardy clause only applies to criminal cases, and since civil forfeiture 
is civil in nature under the two-prong analysis developed in Ward, the 
double jeopardy clause does not apply to this law enforcement mechanism. 
Considering that after Ursery the Supreme Court has not granted a writ 
of certiorari regarding the constitutionality of parallel civil forfeiture 
proceedings and criminal prosecutions under the double jeopardy clause, 
the Court is unlikely to change its interpretation. The discussion about 
this specific matter, thus, would be concluded.
The foregoing assertion does not mean, however, that parallel 
civil forfeiture proceedings and criminal prosecutions do not have 
constitutional limitations. Indeed, the same Supreme Court has noted 
that some of the ills that have been tried to be solved applying the double 
jeopardy clause are addressed by other constitutional provisions. In 
the case of civil forfeiture, the Supreme Court held in Austin v. United 
States that they are limited by the excessive fines clause of the Eighth 
Amendment. The relevant question is, therefore, whether the civil 
forfeiture in question is “grossly disproportionate” to the gravity of the 
offence committed by the defendant. If so, the forfeiture will be contrary 
to the Eighth Amendment. 
Developing more accurate criteria and guidelines to ascertain 
when a forfeiture is grossly disproportionate is the road that scholars 
and courts should follow. 
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